Polanyi and List Meet in Brussels
Digital Sovereignty and the Transformation of (EU) Digital Policymaking
UACES Conference 2024
Timo Seidl (University of Vienna)
www.timoseidl.com
In today’s ‘geo-tech world’ (King 2019), thinking about the politics of digital capitalism requires us to think in terms of a two-dimensional geometry of political conflict (Bradford 2023):
Since the late 1980s, European digital policymaking has, with some exceptions, been shaped by a ‘neoliberal rationality (…) discursively framed and legitimized by the ideas, promises and conception of [the] global information society’ (Dammann and Glasze 2023, 1101; cf. König 2022; Newman 2020).
Since the late 2010s, however, European policymakers have both embraced the language of digital sovereignty and moved away from an approach to digital policymaking predominantly centered on de-, non-, or self-regulation (Cini and Czulno 2022; Cioffi, Kenney, and Zysman 2022; Falkner et al. 2024).
‘To be digitally sovereign, the EU must build a truly digital single market, reinforce its ability to define its own rules, to make autonomous technological choices, and to develop and deploy strategic digital capacities and infrastructure. At the international level, the EU will leverage its tools and regulatory powers to help shape global rules and standards’ (European Council 2020).
I suggest understanding digital sovereignty as an expression of—and as a discursive tool to organize—two countermovements against the neoliberal model of digitalization (governance):
A Polanyian countermovement wants to limit the digitally-enabled expansion of markets and wrest back rule-making authority over the digital world from private platforms. The goal is to (re-)politicize digital policymaking.
A Listian countermovement wants to reduce techno-economic dependencies from rival or enemy countries through various forms of ‘government economic activism’ (Helleiner 2021, 4). The goal is to geopoliticize digital policymaking.
Polanyian Version of Digital Sovereignty | Listian Version of Digital Sovereignty |
---|---|
Reasserting Marketcraft | Rediscovering Statecraft |
Platforms vs States | Competing State-Platform-Nexuses |
Market-Constraining (Market-Correcting) | Market-Directing |
Socially-oriented actors (e.g. Trade Unions, NGO) | Neo-mercantilist actors (e.g. European companies, defense policymakers) |
Markets are always governed (Vogel 2018), but they can be governed in a variety of ways (van Apeldoorn and de Graaff 2022):
Market-creating governance is about creating and expanding (digital) markets.
Market-correcting governance is about correcting (digital) markets with the goal to ensure their better functioning.
Market-constraining governance is about restricting (digital) markets to avoid harm to individuals, groups, or society at large.
Market-directing governance is about directing (digital) markets towards critical or strategic sectors or technologies.
Thank you very much for your attention!